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Constitutional Change by
Amendment: Recommendations of
the Minnesota Constitutional Commission in Ten Years' Perspective
A perennial question arising in many states is whether constitutional change can better be effected by convention or
by amendment. ProfessorMitau evaluatesthe recent accomplishments of the amendment process in Minnesota, which
he deems considerable. Although pointing up some of the
shortcomingsinherent in that process, he pays tribute to the
achievements of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission
of 1947-48 and sees in that process a rather realistic but
cumbersome alternative to the calling of a convention,
which so far has been heavily resisted in this state. He
suggests that the time may be propitiousto appointa second
commission to prescribe further reform and consolidation.

G. Theodore Mitau*
Analysis of the legislative background and objectives of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission reveals that this group was intended neither to draft an entirely new state constitution nor to take
the place of a regular constitutional convention.' Under the terms of
the 1947 statute 2 which established it, this interim commission was
authorized to make a study of the 1857 constitution and its amend* Professor of Political Science, Chairman of the Department, Macalester College.
Much of the research for this Article was undertaken in connection with a chapter in
a forthcoming basic revision by this writer of A IhsToRy OF a-HE CoNsrrurtox oF
MINESoTA (1921) written by Professor William Anderson. This revision is sponsored
by the Minnesota Historical Society. Further aspects of the subject matter of this
Article will be discussed in that chapter.
1. A number of the key legislators supporting the bill creating the Minnesota Constitutional Commission [hereinafter referred to as MCC] viewed this commission as a
"short-cut plan" for overhauling the entire constitutional document. See Halloran, New
Plan Urgedfor Constitution,Minneapolis Sunday Tribune, March 2, 1947, § L (Upper
Midwest), p. 1, col. 6.
2. Minn. Laws 1947, ch. 614.
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ments "in relation to political, economic, and social changes and

developments which have occurred and which may occur," to propose amendments, and to report its recommendations and revisions
to the next session of the Minnesota legislature. 3
The twenty-one member Commission included eight senators,
eight representatives, four gubernatorial appointees (one from the

executive branch and three citizens-at-large) and one person selec-

ted by the chief justice of the state supreme court.4 On July 1, 1947,
at the first regular organizational session, Dr. Lloyd M. Short, Pro-

fessor of Political Science and Director of the Public Administration
Center at the University of Minnesota, and one of Governor Youngdahl's appointees to the Commission, was elected chairman; Mr.
Earl L. Berg, then State Commissioner of Administration and the
representative from the executive branch, was elected secretary.5
The report submitted by the Commission eighteen months later at-

tests to the high quality of public service rendered by its chairman
and its entire membership, all of whom volunteered hundreds of
hours of participation in one or more of the eight major subject
matter committees into which the Commission divided itself for

purposes of research and public hearings. 6
The final report submitted to the legislature recommended the
addition of six new sections to the then-existing Minnesota constitution. It also called for major changes in 84 sections and for "minor
changes, consolidations, or deletions of obsolete material in 78 other
sections. . . .- ' The state constitution, if revised to conform to the
Commission's prescriptions, would run nearly 10,000 words less than
3. REPORT OF TlBE CONSTITUTIONAL CONiEiiSSION OF MINNESOTA 9 (1948). Dr.
Lloyd M. Short's courtesy in permitting the author to examine the minutes and correspondence of the MCC is hereby gratefully acknowledged.
4. The members of the MCC consisted of the following: Senators William E. Dahlquist, A. R. Johanson, Henry A. Larson, Milton C. Lightner, Gerald T. Mullin, Elmer
Peterson, Gordon Rosenmeier (Vice-Chairman), and Harry L. Wahlstrand; Representatives Thomas N. Christie, E. B. Herseth, Stanley W. Holmquist, Frank B. Johnson, 0. L. Johnson, Harold R. Lundeen, Howard W. Rundquist, and Robert J. Sheran;
Justice Leroy E. Matson, Mr. Earl L. Berg (Secretary), Mr. George W. Lawson, Mrs.
Mabeth Hurd Paige (resigned May 17, 1948), Miss Helen Horr (appointed July 19,
1948), and Dr. Lloyd M. Short (Chairman).
5. The MCC was assisted by a small research staff consisting of three part-time graduate assistants in the Public Administration Center of the University of Minnesota;
Thomas L. Culhane was the Director of Research.
6. Banks and Corporations, Rep. Robert J. Sheran, Chairman; Education, Sen. Harry
L. Wahlstrand, Chairman; Executive, Rep. Howard W. Rundquist, Chairman; Highways and Airports, Rep. 0. L. Johnson, Chairman; Judiciary, Justice Leroy E. Matson,
Chairman; Legislative, Sen. Gordon Rosenmeier, Chairman; Local Government, Sen.
William E. Dahlquist, Chairman; and Taxation and Finance, Sen. Gerald T. Mullin,
Chairman. Mr. Val Bjornson was Chairman of the Committee on Public Information,
which included newspaper publishers, editors, radio commentators, and journalism
professors from the University of Minnesota. There were also a number of other
prominent representatives from legislative, civic, and professional groups on each of
these committees.
7. MCC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 15.
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the then-existing document. A brief break-down of the major recommendations would necessarily include mention of the following: (1)
strengthened provisions for home rule by Minnesota municipalities;
(2) removal from the constitution of the specific enumeration and
description of the states seventy basic trunk highways; (8) provisions for a more highly unified state judicial system with compulsory
judicial retirement at age seventy; (4) appointment rather than
election of such state constitutional officers as secretary of state and
treasurer; (5) submission to the voters at twenty-year intervals of
the question of whether or not a constitutional convention should be
held; (6) removal of the unrealistic state debt limit- this to be
replaced by explicit and stricter provisions for debt retirement; (7)
clarification of the order of gubernatorial succession; (8) mandatory
legislative reapportionment following each federal census; (9) consolidations of certain trust funds; (10) constitutional safeguarding
of a state-wide merit system; (11) formalized procedures for the
executive budget; (12) modification of the existing dedicated fund
procedures to permit the deducting of their administrative costs and
the investment of the resulting Inet proceeds only; (13) changes in
the constitutional amendment process to make the submission of
amendments somewhat more difficult but the ratification considerably easier.
The purposes of this present study are to examine the substance
of some of these recommendations and to determine the extent to
which the subsequent constitutional amendments adopted by Minnesota voters have incorporated or have not incorporated the reforms
proposed by the 1947 Commission.
I.

RtECOMMENnATIONS AND CHANGES

A. Legislature
The Commission8 suggested that the rigid ninety-day limit on
regular sessions be modified, and that the legislature be considered
a continuous body" with power to exceed the ninety-day limit, if it
so voted by concurrent resolution in both houses within the first
seventy-five days of session. 9 This suggestion, of course, would also
8. The MCC legislative committee had divided itself into the following subcommittees: Elections, Suffrage and Impeachment, Rep. Harold R. Lundeen, Chairman; Legislative Procedure, Rep. Walter F. Rogosheske, Chairman; Membership, Mr. R. J. Quinlivan, Chairman; and Restrictions on the Legislature, Sen. Milton C. Lightner,
Chairman.
9. At least four of the total of eight specific research reports prepared for this MCC
committee by the research staff dealt with this provision: MCC Research Staff, ConstitutionalLimitationson Length of Legislative Sessions, MCC LEcIs. Comm. REP. No.
5 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Study of Bills Remaining on Senate Orders at the Close
of the 1947 Legislative Session, MCC LEGiS. CoMM. REP.No. 6 (1948); MCC Research
Staff, Minnesota Legislators' Views on Length of Legislative Session, MCC LEGiS.
Comm. REP. No. 7 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Late Introduction of Bills and Legislative Congestion,MCC LEGis. CoMM. RPr. No. 8 (1948).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:461

permit annual sessions, as had been mandatory in Minnesota until
1877.10 With regard to special sessions, the Commission recommended that the legislature be empowered to call itself into session
either "by law or by the joint rules of the Senate and House. ....1n
And it also recommended that when the governor calls the legislature into special session, as he may do under the current constitutional provisions, he should have authority to "limit the matters2 to be
considered at any such session to those specified in the call." 1
The Commission favored the granting of greater power to the
legislature in procedural matters. In addition to recommending that
"no resolution or rule relating to the conduct of the business or adjournment . . . shall require the approval of the Governor," 13 it
suggested that the legislature be permitted to dispense with roll calls
whenever it chose by unanimous consent to do so, and that the requirement to read each bill three times "and at length at least twice"
be abolished. 14
Under the existing constitution, legislators are forbidden to hold
any additional state or federal office, other than that of postmaster,
even if they wish to resign before the end of their term to seek such
office. It was recommended that such disqualification apply only if
the legislator wishes to retain his seat until expiration of his term.
The Commission suggested revocation of the rule currently preventing a legislator from accepting any state office within one year after
expiration of his term if said office is one "created or the emoluments
of which are increased during the session of the legislature of which
he was a member." 15
To date, none of the Commission's legislative recommendations
has found its way into the constitution. In 1959, voters rejected an
amendment 6 which would have liberalized the "holding of other
offices" restrictions. However, this issue will come up again in 1960
at which time the general election ballot is scheduled to include a
proposed amendment originating in last summer's special session of
the legislature. Also included in this pending amendment is the old
MCC proposal that the legislature be empowered to extend the sub10. MCC LEcIS. Coam. REP. No. 7, op. cit. supranote 9 includes a survey ascertaining the views of Minnesota legislators presented in reply to a questionnaire of the MCC
legislative committee. 108 of the 198 legislators questioned replied; 34 favored no time
limit on legislative sessions, 11 favored annual sessions, 12 favored 120 day sessions,
42 favored maintaining the status quo, and the remainder of the responses fell on a continuum ranging from 60 to 180 days.
11. MCC REPORT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 78.
12. Id. at 85.
13. Id. at 80.
14. Id. at 81. The "unanimous consent" requirement originated in a provision added
to the draft in committee. See MCC Minutes, Aug. 19, 1948.
15. MCC REPORT, op. cit. supranote 3, at 81.
16. Minn.Laws 1957, ch. 922, § 1.
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sequent regular session (such extension not to exceed thirty days) .7
Another stipulation in the pending amendment is that, after the
seventieth day of a session, the authorization for introducing new
bills be based on the joint rules of the house and senate rather than
on the written request of the governor.
B. Reapportionment
The Commission recommended that the existing ratio of one
senator per 5,000 inhabitants and one representative per 2,000 inhabitants be changed to 40,000 and 20,000 respectively. Apportionment also was to be "as nearly equal as practicable" -this wording
to replace the rigid, unqualified "equality" specified in the existing
constitution. Two new safeguards were suggested for "area-representation" interests: first, that "no county shall be entitled to more
than one-eighth of all the senators"; and second, that the "area included at the time of the adoption of this amendment in any two
contiguous counties shall not have more than one-fourth of the total
number of senators." '

The notorious unwillingness of the Minnesota legislature to pass
any basic reapportionment bill since 1918, despite its constitutional
authority in this matter and notwithstanding tremendous population
changes and shifts, prompted the Commission to provide mandatory
language and more effective constitutional sanctions. The Commission studied a number of enforcement schemes which have been
employed in other states. For example, in Florida the governor can
call a special session if the legislature fails to reapportion; 19 in Kentucky, the supreme court can review reapportionment upon a citizen's suit;2" and in Arizona, Arkansas, Missouri, and Ohio, where the
legislature has nothing to do with the reapportionment process, enforcement powers are lodged in the secretary of state, 2 in county
17. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 89, § 1.
18. MCC REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 78. This provision was added to the
draft in a committee meeting. See MCC Minutes, Aug. 19, 1948.
19. FL&. CONST. art. VII, § 3.
20. Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 802, 40 S.W.2d 315, 317 (1931), where
the court said: "It is settled that the courts, in a proper case, may interpose for the
protection of political rights, and the right to be equally represented in the legislative bodies of the state is not only a political but a constitutional right as well."
A similar rule may prevail in Ohio on the basis of State ex rel. Herbert v. Bricker,
139 Ohio St. 499, 44 N.E.2d 377 (1942), where the court held that any violation of
the express provisions of Article XI (reapportionment provision of Ohio Constitution)
by the apportioning board makes the apportionment a nullity, and mandamus will lie
to compel compliance with the constitutional requirements.
21. Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 2 provides as follows for the reapportionment of state representatives only:
On the taking of each decennial census of the United States, the secretary of
state shall forthwith certify to the county courts, and to the body authorized to
establish election precincts in the city of St. Louis, the number of representatives to be elected in the respective counties.
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boards of supervisors,22 or in special reapportionment commissions.'
Of these various plans, the Commission decided that the Missouri
law applicable to the reapportionment of senators, providing for a
gubernatorially-appointed ten-member bipartisan reapportionment
commission, seemed most fruitful.
The MCC plan worked as follows: If a legislature failed to
reapportion following a decennial federal census, each of the major
parties would be required to submit a list of ten names to the
governor-this to be done within thirty days after legislative adjournment. From these lists the governor would then select a tenmember committee equally divided between the parties. Upon
completion of its work, this committee would submit its recommendations (based upon its majority vote) "showing the boundaries and
numbers of the districts and the number of members to be elected
therein."2 4 If the committee should fail to discharge its responsibilities, then the upper house would be elected on the basis of five
senators-at-large for each congressional district, and the lower house
on the basis of one representative for each county. Taking cogni22. Auz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1, which provides as follows:
Not less than eight months prior to the regular general election following such
apportionment at which Representatives are to be chosen, the secretary of state
shall notify the board of supervisors of each county the number of Representatives such county will be entitled to elect, and the board shall, not less than six
months prior to such election, divide the county into as many legislative districts
as there are Representatives to be elected.
Note that this provision actually divides the enforcement powers between the county boards of supervisors and the secretary of state.
23. The composition of these special reapportionment commissions differs from
state to state.
A .. CONST.art. 8, § 1, as amended, provides:
A Board to be known as "the Board of Apportionment," consisting of the Governor (who shall be Chairman), the Secretary of State and the Attorney General
is hereby created and it shall be its imperative duty to make apportionment of
representatives in accordance with the provisions hereof ....
Mo. CoNsT. art 3, § 7, relating to the reapportionment of state senators only,
provides:
Within sixty days after this constitution takes effect, and thereafter within
sixty days after the population of this state is reported to the President for each
decennial census of the United States, the state committee of each of the two
political parties casting the highest vote for governor at the last preceding election shall submit to the governor a list of ten persons, and within thirty days
thereafter the governor shall appoint a commission of ten members, five from
each list, to reapportion the thirty-four senators and the numbers of their districts among the counties of the state. If either of the party committees fail to
submit a list within such time the governor shall appoint five members of his
own choice from the party of such committee.
OH1o CONST. art. XI, § 11 provides:
The governor, auditor, and secretary of state, or any two of them, shall at least
six months prior to the October election . . . at each decennial period . . . ascertain and determine the ratio of representation, according to the decennial
census, the number of representatives and senators each county or district shall
be entitled to elect, and for what years within the next ensuing ten years . . ..
24. MCC REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 79.
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zance of the traditional reluctance of the judiciary to assume jurisdiction in reapportionment cases,25 the Commission stated that the
"validity of any reapportionment hereafter made," upon suit by a
qualified voter, is made a "judicialquestion of which the Supreme
Court shall have original jurisdiction... ." 26
Turning from the MCC proposals to the actual legislative history
of reapportionment, we find that although this issue has occupied
Minnesota legislatures intensively since 1947 and although the state
population has increased by over one-third since the apportionment
act of 1913, no measure was successful until the extra session of
1959.27 A plethora of bills failed because of various factors; perhaps
the deep split between the advocates of population-based representation and the advocates of area-representation was most fundamental.
There has also been recourse to the judiciary in the attempt to
compel reapportionment. 8 In State ex rel. Meighen v. Weatheril29
the Supreme Court of Minnesota refused to declare the 1913 act
invalid, stating that "the only objection to the act is that there is not
an entire uniformity in the population of the different districts," and
to justify the court in declaring the
"insufficient
that this alone was
•
" 31
In.1945, there was another attempt to obtain
act unconstitutional.
judicial intervention when a voter questioned "the validity of the
existing legislative districts . . . [and] sought determination of his
rights as a citizen to equal representation in the legislature, as a
voter to an equal voice in the selection of public officials, and as a
taxpayer to an equal voice in the enactment of laws taxing and otherwise affecting citizens and taxpayers." 31 Rejecting this appeal on the
basis of the separation of powers doctrine, the court held that in
matters of reapportionment, "the remedy lies in the political conscience of the legislature, where lies the burden of the constitutional
province of this court to prompt the
mandate. It is not within the
32
action of that conscience."
In 1958, an attempt was made in a federal court 38 to have the
25. Such judicial reluctance is usually predicated on the separation of powers
doctrine, with the court saying that the case presents a "political question" rather than
a "justiciable question." See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 101,

23 N.W.2d 610 (1946); Fergus v. Marks, 321 IIl. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926). See also
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (5-3 decision in a case involving reapportionment of United States representatives).
26. MCC REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 79.
27. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 45.
28. See Note, The Role of the Judiciary in Legislative Reapportionment, 42 Mni.
L. REv. 617 (1958).
29. 125 Minn. 336, 147 N.W. 105 (1914).
30. Id. at 342-43, 147 N.W. at 107.
31. Note, The Role of the Judiciary in Legislative Reapportionment,42 MmnN. L.
RF-v. 617, 625 (1958).
32. Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn. 486, 492, 19 N.W.2d 914, 916 (1945).
33. Magraw v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn., 1958).
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legislature's failure to reapportion itself declared a denial of the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Acknowledging the "unmistakable duty of the State Legislature to
reapportion itself periodically in accordance with recent population
changes," the court then stated that "it is not to be presumed that
the Legislature will refuse to take such action as is necessary to
comply with its duty under the State Constitution."34 Leaving the
matter once more to the conscience of the legislature, the court said
that it would "afford them . . .full opportunity to 'heed the constitutional mandate to redistrict."' 3 5
Finally, in 1959 the legislature passed a reapportionment act 36
maintaining the senate membership at sixty-seven but increasing that
of the house from 131 to 135 beginning with the 1963 session. Under
the provisions of this act, certain rural counties previously holding
one senatorial seat each were combined into a new district to be
represented by one senator only; one large city in a rural county was
given representation separate from its county; and the metropolitan
districts were allotted important additional seats. The senatorial
contingent from Hennepin County was increased from nine to thirteen and its house delegation from eighteen to twenty-six; Ramsey
County increased from six to seven senators and from twelve to fourteen representatives. Rural interests estimated that the 1959 act cost
them a net loss of six senators and fifteen representatives. 37
In addition to this statutory reapportionment, the 1959 extra session approved an amendment3s (to be submitted to popular vote
in the 1960 general election) under the terms of which the future
representation in the 135-member house would be based on population, whereas the 67-member senate would be apportioned "in a
manner which will give fair representation to all parts of the state,"
provided, however, that the five counties adjacent to and including
Ramsey County comprising thirty-five per cent or more of the total
population of the state shall make up thirty-five per cent 39 of the

senate. Beginning in 1970, should the legislature fail to reapportion
following a decennial census, the amendment requires that it go into
special or extraordinary session and remain in session without compensation until its reapportionment task is completed.
This amendment was strongly favored by various rural interests
and rural legislators; some of them had hoped even to make the
statutory reapportionment dependent upon its passage. However, it
34. Id. at 187.
35. Ibid.
36. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 45.
37. Minnesota Farm Bureau News, July 1959, p. 1.
38. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 47.
39. It is not clear whether the provision means "at least thirty-five per cent" or
"not more than thirty-five per cent."
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differed rather fundamentally from the recommendations submitted
by Governor Freeman's twenty-seven-member Citizen-Legislator
Reapportionment Committee, which had proposed a senate apportioned "solely on the basis of population" and a house apportioned
by a formula which assigns one representative to each county above
a minimum population with the remaining representatives assigned
strictly according to population.4 ° The governor's committee suggested that if the legislature failed to reapportion itself, the responsibility should then be placed in a commission of district judges
designated by and representative of every judicial district in the
state. 1
In a special message explaining his unwillingness to approve the
reapportionment amendment proposed by the legislature, Governor
Freeman criticized it on several grounds. 42 First, it lacked any explicit standard to guide the senate in allocating the non-metropolitan
sixty-five per cent of its membership; second, it contained no principle to assure equal representation according to population; third,
the enforcement machinery was inadequate and defective, because
its "no-pay" feature placed the wealthier representatives in a favored
position, at the same time placing the entire legislature under possible pressures from special interests. Moreover, the assumption that
the legislature in extraordinary session would prove any more mindful of its responsibility to reapportion than it has been throughout so
many years of regular sessions seemed to the governor unpersuasive
and unrealistic. Asserting that ample time remained to pass a better
amendment before the 1970 census, the governor chided the legislature for approving the pending measure, particularly because it
allows the senate to "perpetuate its own ideas of apportionment and
thus its independency from the will of the people. It could continue
to avoid and evade the consequences of change and progress."43
The vagueness as to general standards of apportionment, the great
discretionary powers left to the senate in allocating its own membership, the strong opposition of the governor, and the dissatisfaction
of those who demand strong enforcement provisions, and other
factors make the electoral prospects of the reapportionment amendment appear dim indeed.
Projecting these recent developments in reapportionment against
the MCC's recommendations suggests two observations. First, the
reapportionment act of 1959 dealt much more generously with the
40. Citizen-Legislator Reapportionment Committee Makes Recommendations, 44

Mnim. MuNcnA.rrms 59 (1959).

41. Final Report of the Citizen-Legislator Committee on Reapportionment 4
(1959), dittoed copy in executive files.
42. Statement by Governor Orville L. Freeman regarding proposed constitutional
amendment on reapportionment, June 25, 1959, mimeographed copy in executive files.

43. Ibid.
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metropolitan areas than did the MCC report, in which it was declared that "no county shall be entitled to more than one-eighth of
all the senators" and that "no two contiguous counties shall . . .
have more than one-fourth of the total number of senators."" These
rather rigid ceilings on metropolitan representation suggests a failure
on the part of the Commission to anticipate the direction and intensity of the state's population influx and shifts. Of the estimated
thirteen per cent increase in Minnesota's population since 1950,
nearly fifty-six per cent has occurred in the Twin Cities metropolitan
area.45 The five metropolitan counties now comprise forty per cent
of the total population of the state.
As a second observation, it can be noted that the mandatory
sanctions so prominent in the MCC proposal, that is, the provision
for the gubernatorial ten-member commission, together with the
explicit conferral upon the supreme court of original jurisdiction
over reapportionment cases, are still very much missing from the
present Minnesota constitution and the pertinent amendment approved by the legislature and pending before the voters.
C. Executive
In the interests of a strengthened governorship, the Commission 6
recommended reducing the number of constitutional officers from
six to three while lengthening their terms from two to four years.
Since the auditor would be elected by the legislature in the future,
the only remaining popularly-chosen officers in the executive branch,
other than the governor, would be the lieutenant governor and the
attorney general. To afford the governor better opportunity to
fashion an integrated program, the Commission suggested that he
be allowed up to three weeks subsequent to the convening of the
legislature in which to prepare his legislative and budget messages.
And to protect the governor against the pressures exerted on behalf
of patronage and special favor, the MCC urged inclusion in the
constitution of a section safeguarding the civil service system and
principle.
44. See note 18 supra.
45. Minn. Dep't of Employment and Security, Employment Trends, June 1959, p. 1.
46. Research reports for the executive committee included the following: MCC Research Staff, Constitutional Provisions for Elective Officers, MCC ExEc. Comvnm. Rtp.
No. 1 (1947); MCC Research Staff, Succession to the Governorship, MCC ExEc.
Comr. REP. No. 2 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Constitutionaland Statutory Duties
of Certain State Officers- With Special Reference to the Term of Office and Power
of Appointment of the Governor, MCC ExEc. Comm. REP. No. 3 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Election Years of State Officials, MCC Exc. Comm. REP. No. 4 (1948);
MCC Research Staff, ConstitutionalProvisions on the Executive Budget, MCC ExEc.
Comm. REP. No. 5 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Veto Power of the Governor, MCC
ExEC. COm . REP. No. 6 (1948).
47. This recommendation was in line with the long-standing suggestions of the
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The MCC recommended two other changes affecting the powers
and duties of the governor. One of these proposals would change the
composition of the State Board of Pardons (now composed of the
governor, the attorney general, and the chief justice) by replacing
the chief justice with a person appointed by the governor with the
advice and consent of the senate. Such a measure would make pardons a strictly executive function. 8
A second proposal clarified succession to the governorship. If for
any reason a vacancy occurred in the office of governor, the powers
and duties of that office would devolve on the lieutenant governor,
the president pro tern of the senate, and the speaker of the house, in
that order. To further reduce uncertainty in the event that these
three are all unavailable, the Commission suggested that "the oldest
member in chronological age of the Senate shall call the Senate
together to elect a President Pro Tempore." 49
Unlike the proposals relating to the legislative branch, some of the
MCC proposals regarding the executive branch have since been
adopted. A 1954 amendment50 empowered the governor to fill executive vacancies not merely "until the next election" and "until their
successors are chosen and qualified," as heretofore specified in the
constitution, but to make appointments extending to the end of the
term of the vacated office or to the first Monday in January following
the next general election, whichever came sooner. Also, an amendment passed in 1958,51 to take effect in 1963, provides for four-year
simultaneous terms not only for the governor, lieutenant governor,
and attorney general (as recommended by the Commission) but for
the remaining two of the present five constitutional officers as well.
After studying the important question of gubernatorial succession,
the 1959 legislature passed and submitted to the voters an amendment5 2 incorporating most of the MCC objectives in this area. The
"vacancy in the office of governor" clause was replaced by new
language directing the lieutenant governor to assume responsibility
whenever the governor "shall be unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office ... " This amendment also gives the legislature the power to provide by law for succession, not only in the
case of a governor or lieutenant governor's death but also in cases of
"removal, . . . resignation, or inability . . . to discharge the duties
. . ."; and in addition, the legislature is specifically authorized to
Civil Service Reform League.
48. On the essentially executive nature of clemency actions by the pardons board, see
Letter from Chief Justice Loring to Chairman Lloyd M. Short, May 14, 1948.
49. MCC REBonr, op. cit. supra note 3, at 85.
50. Minn.Laws 1953, ch. 762, § 4.
51. Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 813, §§ 8, 5.
52. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 680.
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provide by law for "continuity of government in periods of emergency resulting from disasters caused by enemy attack . . . including but not limited to, succession to the powers and duties of public
office and change of the seat of government." r3
Still remaining unadopted, however, are the MCC's recommendations to reduce the number of constitutional officers, to anchor the
civil service explicitly in the constitution, to provide for an executive
budget, to re-structure the pardon board, and to empower the governor to restrict a legislature in special or extraordinary session to
matters "specified in the call."
D. Judiciary
The changes prescribed by the MCC for the judiciary were both
far-reaching and basic.54 The over-all aim of these recommendations
was to develop a strongly integrated and administratively unified
system and to provide a method of electing judges which would
guarantee and strengthen the independence of the entire bench. In
order to facilitate the internal operations of the judiciary, the legislature was to be given a mandate to establish an administrative
council. This group, chaired by the chief justice, would include one
representative from the public, one from the legal profession, and
one from each of the different types of courts composing the state's
judiciary. It would be given responsibility to "formulate policies for
the efficient administration of the court system" without at the
same time "interfer[ing] with the exercise of the judicial functions
of a judge ..

"5
,

Adopting a modified version of the so-called Missouri plan, the
Commission advocated far-reaching changes in the election of
supreme court judges. According to the new plan, the legislature
would provide by law for a nonpartisan judicial commission, which
53. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 680, § 1.
54. The MCC bad before it a careful study of the Minnesota judiciary prepared
in 1942 by the Committee on the Unification of the Courts to the Judicial Council of
Minnesota. This group, under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Loring, proposed a
revision of Article VI, which aimed at correcting three major features in Minnesota's
then-existing court structure which it considered particularly weak: (1) lack of unity
and administrative supervision in our courts; (2) lack of rule-making powers in the
courts; (3) unsatisfactory method of selecting the judiciary and the brevity of tenure.
A number of the basic provisions of the report were incorporated into the MCC draft.
See MCC Junc. CoMm. R.P. No. 7 (1948).
55. MCC REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 88. Correspondence in the files of the
Commission revealed considerable criticism by leading members of the district bench
concerning the extent of power that might be lodged in such an administrative council. Also discussed in committee but finally rejected were new provisions (1) for allowing jury trials to persons charged with violating a municipal ordinance and (2)
^or imposing a restriction of $100.00 minimum for jury trials in controversies arising
at common law. See MCC JuDic. Comm. REP. No. 3 (1948); MCC Minutes, July 22,
1948.
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group in turn would submit a list of three names to the governor
whenever a supreme court vacancy occurred. The governor would
then make the appointment from this set of nominees. A judge so
selected would serve until the next election, and if after one election
"on his own" he sought re-election, the ballot would be so constructed that the voter would merely vote on the question of
"whether [the incumbent] shall be continued in office" or not.56

In regard to retirement policies, the MCC not only specified a
compulsory retirement age of seventy for judges5 7 but also empowered the governor to force prior "retirement" when "it appears that
any justice or judge is so incapacitated as substantially to prevent
him from performing his judicial duties....
Such forced retirements could be executed upon recommendation from a commission
of inquiry appointed by the governor.
Two amendments have been added to the judiciary article since
the MCC made its report. A 1954 measure 59 dealing with the probate court and its jurisdiction gave the legislature power to determine the qualifications of probate judges and to confer jurisdiction
on these courts (by two-thirds vote). Two years later a more comprehensive amendment 6 o was passed, the twelve sections of which
affected nearly all phases of Minnesota's judiciary. In language taken
almost verbatim from the Commission's report, the amendment defined the judiciary as follows: "The judicial power of the State is
...vested in a supreme court, a district court, a probate court, and
such other courts, minor judicial officers and commissioners with
jurisdiction inferior to the district court as the legislature may
establish." 61 Also in line with MCC recommendations, the clerkship

of the supreme court was made an appointed, rather than an elected,
office; the terms for all state judges were set at six years; the position
of justice of the peace was removed from the constitution; the
qualifications of all other judges were made a statutory matter, as
was district court jurisdiction; the elected term of district court
clerks was lengthened from four to six years; and the state law
librarian (heretofore a gubernatorial appointee) was made an appointee of the supreme court.
The 1956 amendment, however, deviated in a number of major
respects from the MCC proposals. First and foremost, it made no
56. Discussion of this provision centered around a basic conflict of views concerning independence of the judiciary. See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
57. MCC REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 44-45. By its terms, this provision applies only to supreme court justices and district and probate court judges.
58. Id. at 88.
59. Minn. Laws 1953, ch. 759, § 1.
60. Minn. Laws 1955, ch. 881.
61. MCC REPoRT, op. cft. supra note 3, at 41.
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provision for an administrative council. Second, it made no explicit
reference to the Missouri plan for selecting supreme court justices.
Third, it lacked constitutional provision for a compulsory judicial
retirement age and, likewise, for gubernatorial removal of a judge
upon determination of his substantial incapacity. And fourth, whereas the MCC had lodged the making of "rules of practice, procedure,
and evidence for all the courts" in the hands of the legislature, the
1956 amendment remained silent on that subject.62
E. Local Government
Amendments adopted in 1881 and 1891 contained strong prohibitions against special legislation. Consequently, whenever the Minnesota legislature wished to raise salaries of certain local officials or
to regulate local governmental powers and duties, it was obliged to
write thinly disguised general laws in lieu of special laws. The MCC
wished to acknowledge the need for certain types of special legislation without encouraging at the same time an unwarranted and
camouflaged intrusion into the affairs of local governments.0 3 To this
end, the MCC approved a return to special laws, provided that two
conditions could be met, namely, that the law specify the locality
affected, and that the voters of the said locality concur (by majority
vote). Home rule for cities, villages, and even counties was to be
further encouraged by new provisions greatly simplifying charter
adoption, reform, and even abandonment.
To the MCC, some such encouragement of home rule seemed
desirable. It might be noted that in 1958 only eighty-six Minnesota
cities had home rule charters, and only sixty-three out of 731 villages
had adopted optional village forms departing from the standard
village pattern.64 Among the reasons for this rather lukewarm interest
are: the heavy majority required for charter adoption(four-sevenths
62. Professor Maynard E. Pirsig conducted a very thorough and scholarly analysis
on the development of judicial reform in Minnesota from 1942 up to the submission
of the 1956 amendments. Pirsig concluded:
[Although] the proposed judiciary article contains a substantial number of desirable improvements over the present constitution . . . with respect to the
three major needs of court organization existing in this state, the article is a
disappointment. These ard the need for an effective administrative organization
of the courts, the reorganization of the local court structure, and substitution of
court appointment for the present election of clerks of district court.
See Pirsig, The Proposed Amendment of the Judiciary Article of the Minnesota
Constitution, 40 Mmnn. L. REv. 815, 841 (1956). Pirsig was a special consultant to
the MCC judiciary committee and prepared a separate draft for its consideration.
63. There were two research reports for the committee on local government: MCC
Research Staff, Extracts: Constitutional Provisions on County Consolidation, CityCounty Consolidation, City-County Separation, MCC LOCAL Gov'T Comm. REP. No.
1 (1948), and MCC Research Staff, (A) ConstitutionalProvisionson Local Government Options for Governmental Organization, Areas and Powers and (B) Formation
tion of New Counties, MCC LocAL Gov'T Commnr. REP. No. 2 (1948).
64. 43 Mn-N. MusciAirrms 267 (1958).
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of the vote) and for charter amendment (three-fifths); the complex
and expensive newspaper publication requirements for proposed
charters; the rigid six-month time limit on the deliberations of the
charter comaission; and the atmosphere of doubt concerning the
legal powers of a city or village to abandon a once-adopted charter.65
With these impediments in mind, the Commission urged the removal from the state constitution of administrative details relating
to the submission, filing, and publication of charters. Instead, broad
enabling statutes were deemed sufficient to cover such matters as the
initiation and preparation of charters by charter commissions, the
size of majority required for adoption, and the size of vote required
for modification or for termination. Also left to legislative discretion
were questions involving the direct election of charter commissions
(as against their appointment by district judges) and the propriety
of city-county consolidations by means of home rule charters.
The 1958 local government and home-rule amendment 66 implemented nearly all of the relevant objectives of the MCC. Going even
further, this amendment removed the 50,000-population minimum
previously required for city-county consolidation under a home rule
charter. A complicated classification of local governments on the
basis of population and other criteria was entirely revoked and replaced by broader language granting the legislature enabling powers
to "provide by law for the creation, organization, administration,
consolidation, division, and dissolution of local government units and
their functions . . . including [the] qualifications for office, both
elective and appointive. . . ." 6

F. Highways
The MCC offered an entirely new and greatly abbreviated Article
XI eliminating the detailed description and listing of Minnesota's
seventy basic trunk highways as enumerated in the famous Babcock
amendment of 1920. Also it urged consolidation of other constitutional language dealing with highway finances, 68 and it recommended the extension of state supervision and control of highways
constructed with state finds.69 In place of three funds- the state
road and bridge fund, the trunk highways sinking fund, and the
trunk highway fund-the MCC advocated the establishment of one
65. Ibid.
66. Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 809.
67. Minn. Laws 1957, ch.809, § 1.
68. See MI-N. CONST. art. IX, § 5.
69. The highways and airports committee had two special research studies prepared for its consideration: MCC Research Staff, Determination of Routing bf State
Highways, MCC Hw~s. & AmPORTS Comm. BEP. No. 1 (1948), and MCC Research
REP'.
Staff, State Highway Funds and Finances, MCC Hwys. & AsmponTs Comz,.
No. 2 (1948).
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fund into which all gasoline and motor vehicle taxes should be paid.
It also recommended a legislatively-established special highway
commission "to study the trunk highway system"70 and to recommend changes to the legislature. According to the Commission, all
additions, changes, and deletions within the basic state road system
should be considered legislative functions.
Once again, MCC recommendations were to find acceptance in
an amendment adopted in 195671 which deleted the detailed highway descriptions, granted the state highway department greater
supervision and control over construction and maintenance, and permitted a certain flexibility in routing. With reference to the lastnamed provision, the amendment stated that the "said highways
shall extend as nearly as may be along the routes numbered 1 through
70," 7 but it permitted deviations provided the starting points, terminals, and villages and cities en route were respected. Specific localeft to "boards, officers, or tribunals," as
tions, however, 7were
3
provided by law.

This amendment authorized the legislature to add 12,000 miles of
new highways to the system, and to add even more if "necessary or
expedient to meet, use, or otherwise take advantage of any federal
aid made available by the United States. .

.

Unlike the MCC

recommendations, the 1956 amendment added county state-aid and
municipal state-aid highways, permitting the legislature to provide
for highways within a system "established, located, constructed,
reconstructed, improved and maintained" 75 by counties, cities, villages, or boroughs.
Three major types of highway funds were created by the 1956
amendment: the highway user tax distribution fund, the trunk highway fund, and the county and municipal state-aid funds. Net proceeds of the highway user tax are to be distributed according to
formula, with sixty-two per cent alloted to the trunk highway fund,
twenty-nine per cent to the county fund, and nine per cent to the
municipal fund. Whereas the MCC did not specify limits on the
issuance and sale of bonds for highway purposes, the 1956 amendment placed a ceiling of 150 million dollars on bonds issued and
unpaid. It also specified a maturation period of twenty years and
directed that the interest rate not exceed five per cent per annum.
G. Other Major MCC Recommendations
After study of the constitutional articles and sections dealing with
70. MCC REPORT, op. cit. .supranote 3, at 68.
71. Minn. Laws 1955, ch. 882.
72. Minn. Laws 1955, ch. 882, § 2.

73. Ibid.

74. Minn. Laws 1955, ch. 882, § 1.
75. Ibid.
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finance, corporations, and taxation, the MCC made a number of
proposals.7 6 It urged the elimination of a most unrealistic $250,000
state debt limit; it recommended a two-thirds vote requirement for
legislation changing rates or methods of taconite ore taxation; and
it advocated deletion of most of the present constitutional language
referring to banking laws, including the imposition of double liability
on state bank stockholders."7 In addition, the Commission proposed
the elimination of the constitutional requirement that the legislature
submit to the voters (in amendment form) any increases in the
gross-earnings tax on railroads.
Some action has been taken on these matters since 1948. The occupation tax section of the constitution was altered in 1956 78 to
permit allocation of these monies to current state education needs as
follows: Fifty per cent will go into the state general revenue fund as
before. However, forty per cent of the remainder (formerly earmarked for permanent trust funds) will be given to state elementary
and secondary education, and the remaining ten per cent will be
allocated to the University of Minnesota.
Among the most significant of the MCC recommendations were
those relating to constitutional conventions and the amendment
process. In studying these matters, the Commission was able to make
comparisons between the pre-1898 situation and the decades following. Before that year, an amendment could pass with the approval of
a simple majority of those voting on the question; after 1898, passage
required a majority of all those voting in that election.
Number of
amendments
proposed

Number
adopted

Number
rejected

Percentage
adoptions

Percentage
rejections

1858 -1898

66

48

18

72.7

27.3

1898 - 1946
1946 - 1958

80
22

26
11

54
11

32.5
50.0

67.5
50.0

Years

The table 71 shows rather clearly the changing pattern in percentage of adoptions and rejections since revocation of the pre-1898
76. Research studies for the taxation and finance committee included the following: MCC Research Staff, Obsolete Provisions of the Minnesota Constitution Relating
to Taxation and Finance, MCC TAx & Fmn. COMM. REP. No. 2 (1948); MCC Research Staff, ConstitutionalDebt Limits in the States, MCC TAx. & FiN. Co m. REP.
No. 3 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Land Grants and Trust Funds, MCC TAx &FIN.

Coifn. RE'P. No. 4 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Property Exempt from Taxation in
the Various States, MCC TAx. & Fur. COMM. REP. No. 5 (1948); MCC Research
Staff, Estimated Assessed Value of Personal Property and Taxes Payable Thereon in
Minnesota-1948, MCC TAx & FiN. COmm. RF,. No. 6 (1948); MCC Research
Staff, Dedication of Revenues by State Constitution,MCC TAx. & FiN. Co m. REP.
No. 7 (1948); MCC Research Staff, Forestry Provisions in State Constitutions, MCC
TAx &Fin. Comm. REP. No. 9 (1948).
77. An amendment relating to liability of stockholders was successfully ratified in
1954. Minn. Laws 1953, ch. 760.
78. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1955, ch. 6, §§ 1, IA.
79. Figures from 1858-1946 were compiled by the MCC.
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amendment procedure, which, compared with other states, was one
of the easiest amendment formulas available. Basically, the Commission called for a return to the pre-1898 formula but with a stiffening
of the legislative phase of the process. Instead of approval by a
simple majority, the MCC felt it wiser to require a two-thirds legislative majority as prerequisite to the submission of an amendment
to popular vote. While obviously slowing down the rate of submission, such a formula would enhance submitted amendments' chances
with the voting public.
Even more far-reaching were the Commission's proposals regarding constitutional conventions: (1) Not later than 1960 and every
twenty years thereafter, the question of a constitutional convention
is to be submitted to the electorate. (2) If a majority of those voting
on the question declare in favor of a convention, the legislature must
provide for the calling of one. (3) Upon completion of the convention session and submission of its draft to the public, an election must
be held on the proposed constitution or amendments -this to take
place not less than sixty days, nor more than six months, following
adjournment. (4) If a majority of those voting on the proposals approve, they shall take effect.
Minnesota voters defeated two relevant amendments in 1948. One
of these would have permitted the legislature to submit two or more
amendments to the public without requiring a separate vote on each. 0
The other amendment would have permitted the legislature to call
a constitutional convention without submitting the question to the
people.81 In 1954, an amendment passed82 which required that in
order for a revised constitution to take effect (when submitted by a
convention), it must be affirmed by three-fifths of those voting on
it. This same amendment made it permissible for members of the
legislature to become candidates for membership in a constitutional
convention.
II. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATONS

Even the briefest survey of constitutional changes via the amendment process cannot help but reveal significant substantive achievements since 1948. The governorship and judiciary have been
strengthened. Municipal home rule and other types of local government units enjoy a constitutionally more friendly climate for change
than formerly. The new highway article has permitted more effective
integration of the highway system while fu-ishing it with a better
financial base. Portions8 3 of the occupation tax have been made
80. Minn. Laws 1947, ch. 640, § 1.
81. Minn. Laws 1947, ch. 641, § 1.
82. Minn. Laws 1953, ch. 761, § 1.

83. For a statement of the portions of the tax allocated for educational purposes,
see text commencing at note 78 supra.
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available for immediate educational needs. Pending on the 1960
ballot are additional amendments involving a variety of matters:
gubernatorial succession, 4 continuity of government in the face of
military emergencies, 5 extension of legislative sessions, 8 liberalizing
of the impediments to legislators' quests for other offices,s 7 provisions
to facilitate voting by persons who have moved from their precinct
within thirty days preceding an election,88 removal from the constitution of obsolete language governing the franchise of Indians,8 and
reapportionment.
Whatever their electoral prospects, the mere presence of these
amendments on the ballot testifies to the increasing pressures for
constitutional reform in Minnesota. To obtain further confirmation
of this trend, one need only note the remarkable increase in the
ratio of amendments adopted to amendments rejected since 1948.91
This trend, when considered along with the reapportionment act of
1959, indicates an increased willingness among legislators and the
public to support reforms, and to do so via the piecemeal revisionism
of statutory and amendment processes. Among some persons, it
might be hazarded, this willingness is motivated less by enthusiasm
for reform per se than by fear that otherwise a constitutional convention-the more drastic alternative hovering in the background of
Minnesota politics-might be thrust upon them.
But the amendment process, which Minnesotans seem to prefer to
the wholesale revisions effected by a constitutional convention, contains some real weaknesses. The record of rejected amendments
shows that reforms relating to governmental structure and other
technical reforms of great importance may yet fail to evoke sufficient
public support to meet the onerous requirements for passage in an
election. This has been true particularly in the case of proposals
dealing with obsolete voter qualifications. The imprecise or incomplete wording of an amendment - which is a necessary evil, given
84. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 680, § 1.
85. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 680.
86. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 89, § 1. Currently, prospects for the adoption of this amendment, however, are not very bright. Based on the findings of the
Minnesota Poll, a majority of all those interviewed appear to oppose it:
Women
Men
Total
31%
30%
31%
In favor
47%
62%
54%
Against
22%
8%
15%
No opinion
Against Proposed Measure on '60 Ballot, Minneapolis Sunday
Minnesota Poll-54%
Tribune, Nov. 1, 1959, § E (Ed.-Bus.), p. 3, cols. 7, 8.
87. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 89, § 2.
88. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 675, § 2, 8, 5.
89. Minn. Laws 1959, ch. 696, § 1.
90. Minn. Laws Extra Sess. 1959, ch. 47.
91. To compare the ratio of amendments adopted and rejected between 1898 and
1948 and from 1948 to the present, compare the table in the text preceding note 79
supra with the tables appended to this Article.
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the exigencies of the printed ballot-may compromise its chances
of success, thus entailing repeated submission and added expense.
Because of the great pressures and other adverse conditions under
which harassed legislators must work during their limited session,
the careful deliberation and the impeccable wording a constitutional amendment deserves are not always attainable. Also, there is
something in the very nature of the amendment process, namely,
that it is difficult to debate selected aspects of a proposed amendment without endangering its passage and thus forfeiting the many
real reforms latent in the measure as a whole. Critics of the judiciary
article, for example, may well have felt concern over the extent to
which rules of evidence and procedure might pass out of the hands
of the judiciary, and they may have feared loss of the independence
of the judiciary from other branches of government; 9 2 and yet the
benefits of the proposed amendment so far outweighed these misgivings that many of them voted for it notwithstanding.
Viewing the work of the Minnesota Constitutional Commission
in the perspective of the last ten years, one impression stands out
above all others. Minnesota owes this body a profound debt of
gratitude for the care with which it phrased its recommendations,
for its professional and scholarly approach, and for its lively concern
for the possible and the practical. Entire sentences in subsequent
amendments can be traced back to the language of the MCC report;
the amendments themselves often serve as substantive implementation of the Commission's prescriptions.
Yet, much work remains to be done, if a 102-year old constitution
is to provide this state with a basic charter adequate to the needs of
an increasingly complex society and to the requirements of a state
policy existing within the context of a dynamic federalism. Those
who favor reform via constitutional convention may see little in the
record of the last ten years to challenge their preference for the convention method as against the piecemeal amendment process. To
their way of thinking, complicated and fundamental problems, such
as dedicated funds, taxation, mandatory reapportionment, periodic
constitutional conventions, further streamlining of the governorship
and legislature, and possible provisions for referendum and popular
initiative, do not lend themselves readily to the fragmentary treatment afforded by the mere amending of existing documents.
92. In criticizing the Loring Committee's Report, Professor Anderson, for example,
wrote: "The aim seems to be to establish a judicial branch of the government that
is almost entirely insulated from politics and from the other two branches of state
government." Anderson, Reorganizing Minnesota's Judiciary, 27 Mu-N. L. Riv. 383,
387 (1943). It was further his position that the proponents of this position envisage
a guild system that would be difficult to reconcile with democratic political theory. Ibid.
A similar position is taken by Forrest Talbott, author of I ncovimmerTAL RELATIoNs Aim nm CouRTs (1950). Memorandum from Forrest Talbott to G. Theodore

Mitan, Oct. 22, 1959.
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Minimalists, on the other hand, may regard Minnesota's ten-year
record of constitutional reform as an ample warrant for continued
confidence in the amendment process, especially if this process were
to be revitalized by the recommendations of a second constitutional
commission. Such a commission, approaching its task with the professional competence and civic dedication of its distinguished predecessor, might review present needs; intensify the scrutiny of obsolete
constitutional language, 93 as for example that pertaining to a
restricted women's suffrage or to the election of United States Senators; and suggest broad measures, as did the 1948 Commission,
which when embodied in amendments, would enable this state to
continue and perhaps accelerate its slow and patient program of
limited ad hoc constitutional reform.
93. Whether removal of obsolete constitutional provisions could be achieved by a
single amendment or whether this would necessitate multifarious amendments is essentially a judicial question. See Winget v. Holm, 187 Minn. 78, 244 N.W. 331
(1932), where the court held that to qualify as separate amendments, "the changes
proposed must be independent and unrelated so as not to fit in with the one general
aim or purpose of the amendment framed." Id. at 86, 244 N.W. at 334. See also
Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 89 N.W.2d 635 (1958).
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